On the heels of Aliyev-Pashinyan talks in Munich: Positivity short of momentum Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov

“The latest meeting between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in Munich was neither a breakthrough, nor the progenitor, of a qualitatively new momentum per se, and was not meant to be one”, argues Orkhan Amashov in his latest “Contemplation”. The author, however, appears to believe that the nature of the peace process has palpably changed in 2024 and the character of the bilateral compromise reached on 7 December 2023 will continue to herald forthcoming developments.

Although it remains a task of considerable difficulty to gauge the present mood in the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace talks, what is obvious to the unaided eye is that the negotiations are now purely bilateral, with no overarching sense of palpable urgency, as far as one can genuinely perceive, with external actors limited to the self-effacing role of providing a venue in a third country for the sides to engage. There is, however, a hope that in the year of COP29, which Baku will host, further stimuli for advancing the peace agenda between the two neighbouring nations will continue to emerge.

Almost all bilateral meetings between President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, be they “ostensibly unexpected” one-to-one encounters on the margins of international conferences, or arranged on a formal footing, have had one common feature of producing the synergy of “calming” and “galvanising” effects, to varied degrees.

If the former has served to introduce “tranquillity” to the scene of heightened tensions on the ground and hardened rhetoric emanating from both sides, the latter has proven vital in adding, at least, a simulacrum of dynamism to the talks, raising hopes and limiting stagnation. The resultant impact of these two, at times, has spawned episodes of momentum within loosely defined timeframes, within the scope of which Baku and Yerevan have made some progress towards peace.

It is not readily ascertainable as to whether the 17 February direct talks between Aliyev and Pashinyan, held at the initiative of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, has produced the effect of renewed momentum, but both “calming” and “galvanising” effects were present, albeit not so profoundly, and just toddling up to the bare minimum.

The meeting came hot on the heels of a deadly cross-border flare-up following five months of relative stability; on 12 February, a trigger-happy Armenian sniper fired on an Azerbaijani border guard and, on 13 February, Baku took a retaliatory punitive measure, resulting in the deaths of four Armenian soldiers, another being wounded, who later emerged to be senior volunteers from a militant group called ‘Yerkrapah’, and not members of the regular army.

Azerbaijan has, for some time, raised concerns over the role played by the EU civilian mission hosted on the Armenian side of the conditional border, criticising it for creating a “permissive atmosphere” for Yerevan to endanger Azerbaijani positions. Yerevan, for its part, has repeatedly praised the mission for “contributing to stability”. 

The nature of the incident, manifestly provoked by the Armenian side, either deliberately or due to the lack of control over some of the troops deployed on the border, presented Baku with a fresh opportunity to reassess the EU’s impartiality. To this end, High Commissioner Joseph Borrell’s assessment found the Armenian sniper shooting as “deplorable” and viewed the Azerbaijani reaction as “disproportionate”, “ignoring the announcement by Armenia’s Defence Ministry that the incident would be fully investigated”. This was perceived in Baku as pro-Yerevan.

Borrell’s reiteration of the idea of urgent mirror distancing of the troops from the border has only augmented Azerbaijan’s reservations as to the EU’s unbiased approach. The latest incident has given a new impetus to Baku’s argument that “mercenaries deployed by Armenia in border regions ‘under the patronage of the EU civilian mission, jeopardise the lives of Azerbaijani servicemen and civilians”, and, therefore, Azerbaijani retreat from the undefined borders would not of be any practical use to peace. 

The Armenian side, for its part, accused Baku of “looking for pretexts to launch a full-scale invasion”, possibly employing military means to force Yerevan to open the Zangazur passage on Azerbaijan’s terms. Prior to the incident, Prime Minister Pashinyan, who has been under pressure from vast swathes of his internal audience and the opposition for his call for a new constitution which, inter alia, should see the ditching of the reference to the “miatsum” provision embedded in the Declaration of Independence of 23 August 1990, found himself compelled to declare that Armenia’s main law was an internal issue and Baku had no right to demand changes to any provisions amounting to territorial pretensions towards Azerbaijan. 

Pashinyan went on to suggest that “there is an agreed clause in the text of the draft peace treaty, according to which the parties cannot invoke their legislation in order not to fulfil the obligations assumed under the treaty”, somewhat implying that the territorial claims ingrained in Armenia’s Declaration of Independence may remain intact for a while. With rhetoric from Baku clearly indicating that this change should act as a precursor to the peace treaty, this is largely perceived as an attempt by Yerevan not to give an appearance of bowing to Azerbaijan’s demands. 

It is against this volatile backdrop that the Azerbaijani and Armenia leaders met bilaterally in Munich. Given the length of the discussions, which lasted around 20 minutes, it is difficult to say if any tangibly consequential progress was made. However, the calming effect was present, inducing some tranquillity. The “galvanising” effect was present too, perhaps not so notably.   

The sides agreed to hold a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss how to proceed with normalising relations and continue with the meeting of the delimitation commission. The parties also positively assessed the compromise reached in December 2023, as a result of which Azerbaijan will host the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29).

The question of import here is if, in view of what immediately preceded the Munich meeting and could have reasonably been expected, we should rethink our whole approach to Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations in early 2024, which is not burdened with the challenges of 2023.   

With Baku fully reasserting its sovereignty over Karabakh in September 2023, what is left outstanding in thwarting the finalisation of a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia is purely of interstate domain, being the subject of direct talks, with external actors limited to goodwill initiatives in proposing venues. For Azerbaijan, as of today, the peace talks with Yerevan are not even an international issue; Baku seems to view a prospective deal with Armenia as a device to further augment its growing regional, and by extension, global clout, but not regard as a matter of immediate urgency in need of being fixed as soon as possible for the mere sake of doing so. Armenia’s worldview is inherently different, encumbered with fears, uncertainty and internal unrest, but it is too slowly coming to terms with the contours of the regional construct laid down by its neighbour.

The Munich meeting was neither a breakthrough nor the progenitor of a qualitatively new momentum per se. It was not meant to be one. It could be assumed that Aliyev and Pashinyan, both present at the conference, needed to meet out of an unavoidable necessity, with the initiative of the German Chancellor being most welcome and too good to miss. However, it is intensive communications via bilateral channels at different levels in the year of COP29, with its own unique opportunities for advancing the peace agenda, that are likely to mark the main episodes of the succeeding months.