Armenia rushes to the West but will end up in Iran's grip Shereshevskiy on Zangazur corridor and balance of power

The Zangazur corridor will help connect mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and further with Türkiye. This will enable Baku to avoid dependence on Iran, through whose territory the connection with NAR is currently carried out. Türkiye, Azerbaijan's closest military-political and economic ally, will use this corridor to create a bridge for the development of trade in the common space as far as China. The corridor will also allow it to get rid of its dependence on Iran and gain independent access to Central Asian markets.

The Russian-brokered Karabakh ceasefire statement of November 10, 2020, reads that "all economic and transport links in the region must be unblocked". Under its terms, Armenia pledged to guarantee unhindered passage between the countries of the region, and Russian border guards pledged to monitor this.

Russia has nothing against the Zangazur corridor. It is very convenient for Russia, as it will give Moscow direct land access to Türkiye. Relations with this country, which has not joined the majority of anti-Russian sanctions, are becoming extremely important in the eyes of the Kremlin, as Türkiye becomes a gateway to the outside world for the Russian capital. Turnover between the countries has, according to some reports, almost doubled over the last year. If Russian peacekeepers control this route or at least take part in controlling it, Russia would seem to be satisfied.

However, Tehran and Yerevan fear that a Zangazur corridor controlled by Azerbaijani or Russian forces would separate Iran from Armenia. The latter, in turn, would be effectively deprived of potential Iranian military support. For the Iranians, this is not just a geopolitical issue, but also an economic one. Being under sanctions, Tehran is using Armenian companies and enterprises to trade with EU countries, circumventing the sanctions.

The Zangazur corridor "would be a geopolitical disaster for Iran," argues Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian researcher at the Berlin-based SWP think tank. For his part, Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Abbas Badashkhan Zohouri recently said the following about the Zangazur corridor: "Iran and Armenia will not allow the creation of any corridor. Iran and Armenia have been and will be neighbours. Of course, you can see some tricks, and talk about some so-called corridors. But Iran and Armenia will not allow the creation of such a corridor. At the same time, we must not wait until someone comes up with the idea of creating a corridor, for example, to decide then what position to take. We must not allow this to happen. The two countries need to take the initiative, figure out what new actions and steps to take".

Tehran has previously repeatedly stated that it considers attempts to create a corridor as a red line. The smell of an Iranian-Azerbaijani war is in the air. In the event of such a conflict, Türkiye, which has concluded a military-political alliance with Azerbaijan, would not be able to stay away.

Russia, which cooperates with both Iran and Türkiye, and is deeply involved in Ukraine, will probably not interfere. Regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia keeps troops on the territory of Armenia, a CSTO member state. It has stationed its military (peacekeeping forces) in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, which prevents Baku from taking full control of the region, although Karabakh is internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan. At the same time, Russia has close economic ties with Azerbaijan and has supplied it with a huge number of weapons in the recent past. Cooperation between Russia and Türkiye also contributes to Moscow's non-hostile attitude towards Baku, Turkey's closest ally. That is, while Moscow is a military ally of Armenia, it is not hostile towards Azerbaijan. This means that Moscow has no desire to intervene in a possible Azeri-Turkish bloc conflict with Iran and Armenia over Zangazur.

In that case, it is appropriate to ask how likely an Armenian-Iranian military-political bloc will emerge. If such a bloc is formed, it is likely to be linked to the supply of Iranian weapons (today Armenia buys weapons mainly from India). Such a decision could lead to Armenia's isolation from the West since sanctions are imposed on Iranian trade. Even today, for all its multi-vector policy, Armenia's two main allies, Russia and Iran, make it somewhat toxic in the eyes of the West. In the event of the emergence of an Armenian-Iranian military bloc, Armenia could become persona non grata in the West.

Turkish journalist Amberin Zaman notes in this regard: "Pashinyan desperately needs to rebuild his battered army. Russia is nominally Armenia's main supplier, but it has reportedly still not supplied the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms that - at least as the Armenian side claims - were paid for by Yerevan. India is the only country that sells arms to Armenia, largely because its arch-enemy Pakistan is an ally of Azerbaijan. Iran could become an important arms supplier for Armenia. However, the slightest hint of such supplies from Tehran could trigger Western sanctions at a time when this small country of three million is more vulnerable than at any time since it declared independence from Moscow in 1991. The acquisition of Iranian weapons "is not on our agenda," Kostanian, Armenia's deputy foreign minister, told Al-Monitor.

Nevertheless, a politico-military alliance with Iran could be seen in Yerevan as a realistic alternative to trying to rely on Western countries. Neither France nor the US would send troops to protect Armenia's interests. Türkiye is of great importance to NATO as a partner and ally, especially against the backdrop of events in Ukraine. No one in the West would go to war over Armenia and the Zangazur corridor with the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc, especially in the current circumstances. Theoretically, the West could respond to Azerbaijan's attempts to create this corridor with sanctions. But since Azerbaijan is an ally of Türkiye, it may have some immunity from sanctions. In addition, the West fears rising energy prices, of which Azerbaijan is a supplier, and this also reduces the likelihood of serious sanctions.

So, within the framework of Yerevan's chosen course, the possibility of an Armenian-Iranian alliance emerges. "The only real option Tehran has and is working on is to return to its traditional policy of supporting Armenia against Azerbaijan," Azizi says. - I don't even rule out the possibility that Iran might arm Armenia with drones, etc.".

The Armenian leadership is not at all happy about this turn of events. They see Western Europe and America as desirable partners, but they cannot force a change.

Teymur Daimi, an Azerbaijani philosopher, noted: "An alliance with Iran is possible. But Armenia would do this only on the verge of despair. By agreeing to this alliance, it will create problems for itself regarding systemic, i.e. complex rapprochement with the West. The West still sees Iran as a predominantly toxic state".

However, Armenia is already on the brink of despair. The author of this article warned a few years ago, before the 44-day war, that the choice that Armenian politicians define themselves - the choice between Moscow and Paris (or Moscow and Washington) - was likely to be a false one. Western interest in Armenia is not high, and Türkiye (Azerbaijan's closest ally) is extremely important to NATO. As for Moscow, it supports Armenia to some extent, not forgetting its own interests, and they do not contradict the objectives of the Zangazur corridor. Besides, Moscow cannot but be irritated by Pashinyan, who came to power as a result of a colour revolution. Therefore, the result of events may turn out to be quite unexpected, bringing Armenia to Tehran instead of Paris.